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Introduction
Are national parliaments engaged in the preparations of EU defence 
projects? And if so, what are the perspectives of their cooperation in 
this policy field? Do they act more as an active engine towards an 
enhanced common EU defence policy or do they function more as a 
brake? Providing sufficient answers to such complex questions is not 
an easy task. Defence is a policy field in Europe with many intricacies. 
On the one hand, the policy area per se remains an intergovernmental 
bond under the political jurisdiction of the member states; on the 
other hand, the consolidation of a Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) has been fundamentally rejuvenated, especially 
after the latest developments with the formation of the Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PESCO) at the EU level. In this respect, a 
twofold process is always present when it comes to the question of EU 
defence cooperation: the impact of the EU level on national security 
policies and, reciprocally, how member states and their parliaments 
may have an effect on security/defence evolutions at the EU level. 
On 25 of October 2018, the School of Transnational Governance at 
the European University Institute in Florence organised a High-Level 
Policy Dialogue to address the role of national parliaments in EU 
defence cooperation. Academics and practitioners gathered around 
the same table to provide adequate answers and share their knowledge 
on a number of different, but closely inter-related, questions: Do 
national parliaments play a significant role in EU defence policy? 
What are the past and present practices? Are there differences among 
national parliaments in defence affairs? What kind of expectations 
have been formulated for inter-parliamentary cooperation across 
Europe? Are national parliaments and/or the European Parliament 
necessary to provide legitimacy for the EU action? The current 
analysis is the outcome of those discussions, which took place under 
Chatham House Rule and summarises the key points raised from the 
participants in the dialogue room.
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Current Developments at the EU Level
Europe is confronted with enormous security challenges. 
From the publication of the 2003 European Security 
Strategy, in which the European leaders managed to pencil 
a common document considering the security threats of 
Europe and a strategy to counter them, the security threat 
spectrum has been tremendously enlarged at the current 
moment. Security hazards have been broader (i.e. migra-
tion and energy), more dispersed (i.e. cyber attacks) 
and more intense (i.e. terrorism). Europe’s periphery is 
an even more dangerous place to live in: recent regional 
conflicts and tensions such as the Syrian civil war, the 
Ukraine imbroglio and the Arab Spring revolutions are 
the most prominent examples the hard times Europeans 
experience concerning security during the last decade. 
Despite the exacerbation of the security dimensions, the 
European response has been less than swift. It was hard to 
find something interesting and promising with regard to 
the EU defence cooperation after the European Council in 
Helsinki in 1999. However, with developments in the last 
years, there is light in the EU defence policy tunnel. The 
start of the security awakening for Europe can be traced 
back to the 2016 announcement of ‘A Global Strategy for 
the European Union’ by Federica Mogherini. 
This strategy can be considered as a crucial step towards 
a more coherent component of a military dimension of 
EU security policy and a harbinger of the establishment 
of PESCO. The latter has created an innovative institu-
tional framework for the involvement of member states 
in common EU defence projects and, at the same time, 
has marked a new era regarding the future role of the EU 
as a leader in the world security arena. 
In the same vein, the conclusions of the European Council 
in June 2018 have articulated the need for a stronger 
role of Europe regarding its own security by reinforcing 
defence investment, capability development and opera-
tional readiness. In addition, they have highlighted the 
requirement of a close collaboration between the EU and 
NATO on the basis that PESCO will complement, foster 
and promote the existing activities of NATO. What is still 
puzzling is how effective these sort of initiatives would be 
in the domain of defence. 
National Parliaments and the EU Defence 
Puzzle 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, almost a 
decade ago in December 2009, new provisions have been 
set up for the role of national parliaments in the determi-
nation of the EU decision- and policy-making process. 
For the case of defence, the question that is fair to be asked 
is whether national parliaments influence the formation 
of EU defence policy and, consequently, what is their role 
concerning the enhancement of EU security cooperation. 
In the same vein, understanding the opportunities and 
challenges posed by the new defence initiatives at the EU 
level for the national parliaments is also essential.
When it comes to defence policy and the role of national 
parliaments, the first thing we need to take into account 
is whether the defence policy is a ‘special’ or ‘normal’ 
policy issue for national parliaments. Defence is a policy 
area that presents a degree of distinctiveness compared 
to other policy areas because, traditionally, the exec-
utive is the dominant player for this policy field across 
the majority of parliaments. Since defence policy is 
about national interests, the supremacy of the executive 
and, consequently, the exclusion of parliaments, cannot 
be substantially justified. Voters are always sensitive to 
national security issues. For this reason, parliaments 
ought to be interested in having a strong engagement in 
security and defence affairs. 
Regardless, though, of voters’ preferences, why should 
national parliaments be essential for security and defence? 
Parliaments preserve democracy, represent people, con-
trol public spending, review the executive, legitimise the 
use of force, and deal with troop deployments. At the 
EU level, they act as policy shapers, as watchdogs, and 
as public forums where security and defence matters are 
formed and scrutinised. 
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However, there are diverse parliamentary systems across 
Europe with different powers and roles; and, therefore, 
the democratic control of the security sector varies. One 
common aspect across different parliamentary systems in 
Europe is that there is a fundamental degree of ignorance 
in both governments and parliaments about security and 
defence affairs. 
The knowledge about security and defence issues is 
becoming even more complicated because a big number 
of policy areas are linked to each other. Migration and 
energy are salient cases that go hand in hand with security 
and defence. This amalgamation of policy issues further 
increases the complexity of the decision-making process 
in the realm of security and defence: for instance, why are 
member states always very hesitant to join joint actions 
under broader European initiatives?  
Looking at the macro-level context 
There are a couple of reasons to support the view that 
national parliaments play a slight role in EU defence 
cooperation. Looking first at the macro-level horizon: 
despite the recent evolutions at the EU level as described 
above, EU defence cooperation is a business in Europe 
with decreased enthusiasm by all involving parties, 
either European or national. The case of Libya provides 
clear evidence about the unwillingness of the EU to face 
jointly a tension very close to its borders. Similar conclu-
sions can be drawn for the tension in Ukraine or even 
the migration crisis. Coupled with that, NATO is still 
the key security forum in Europe; a state of affairs that 
has been further reinforced by Trump and indicates the 
influence of the United States (US) in European security. 
Brexit is not a positive factor either: the exit of the United 
Kingdom from the EU family will most likely diminish 
the global role of the EU as a security and defence actor. 
Ad hoc coalitions of the EU member states at the inter-
national level, especially under the United Nations hat, 
comprise also difficult tasks for parliamentarians. These 
coalitions, typically initiated from specific member states, 
depict the divergences and compromises politicians face 
when they have to create common missions at the EU 
level. For this reason, parliamentary decisions often have 
to deal with role and responsibility sharing among alli-
ance partners and, more than that, with questions of part-
ners’ reliability.  
The puzzling equation of EU defence cooperation is 
even more complex if we think of the number of players 
involved in defence affairs.  In that regard, information 
sharing and dissemination about defence issues is a major 
issue. On the one hand, there are many centres of infor-
mation and, therefore, information reliability is not an 
assumed matter. On the other hand, information is rather 
low, in both quantity and quality, and not shared given 
the large number of actors engaged in the defence arena 
(e.g. the executive, lobbies, the EU actors etc.). One could 
say that this sort of disinformation leads to a kind of inse-
curity.  
Considering the micro-level environment
Turning our radar to the micro-level context, things are 
also not in favour of a strengthened role of national par-
liaments in EU defence affairs. Do parliaments share the 
willingness to commit resources from the national to the 
EU level? Security cultures are not similar across Europe 
and this is a fundamental drawback for a common com-
mitment toward resource sharing at the EU level.  
Political contestation in security and defence issues is 
more the rule than the exception in all parliaments across 
Europe. Typically, left-wing political parties ask for con-
trol of public spending. With the rise of Eurosceptic 
parties, the debate has changed because the concept of 
sovereignty is at the forefront of the political agenda: the 
sensitive question is about bringing sovereignty back to 
the state. Likewise, a growing fragmentation can be wit-
nessed in how different EU member states perceive the 
notion of threat perception and, consequently, how they 
build their local security contexts. 
In addition to this, the academic landscape does not help. 
There is a clear division between those studying national 
parliaments and those studying defence. This situation has 
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become even more complex when other fields enter this 
academic division: Artificial Intelligence and cyber-secu-
rity are two scientific areas that have been dominating the 
discussions across academia about security and defence 
at least over the last decade.  The problem becomes larger 
when we think about the connection between academics 
and policy-makers. Put bluntly, one would say that the 
policy-making world is fully detached from the academic 
context and their interaction is less than scarce. 
Finally, members of parliaments (MPs) have major real 
constraints to take into account in defence affairs. Very 
often, they cannot cross some very distinct lines, which 
is why there are the generals who take hard choices and 
decisions. For instance, MPs need a tremendous amount 
of detail about deployment of troops to act; but, most of 
the time, the choices that have to be made are extremely 
sensitive for which only the chiefs of armed forces could 
take when advising governments. This severe account-
ability issue frequently arises when MPs come across 
numerous defence affairs.  
Avenues for EU defence cooperation 
across National Parliaments?
The apparent diversity of parliaments across Europe 
does not leave flexible space for cooperation, especially 
with regard to sensitive policy areas such as security 
and defence. However, one would argue that the emer-
gent security state of play today creates the necessity for 
more cooperation across member states and parliaments. 
Common threats are visible, and they need common solu-
tions; but, despite this reality, cooperation is far from per-
fect. If we exclude successful cases such as the strong par-
liamentary cooperation in security affairs among Nordic 
national parliaments, most would agree that this is not 
the case for the majority of parliaments across Europe. 
Are there avenues to be opened for stronger cooperation 
among national parliaments in defence affairs? One opti-
mistic note is that we witness a lot of convergence, both 
from the EU and its member states, regarding stronger 
cooperation in the EU defence field. The case of the newly 
established PESCO could lead the way. The pessimistic 
note is that there is not a lot of show on ground: only 
NATO is active. Therefore, we lack very practical forms 
of cooperation. The mutual defence clause of the Treaty 
of the European Union, i.e. Article 42.7, is nevertheless 
a good starting point for a stronger cooperation in EU 
defence affairs. 
Developments via the EU member states
An essential objective of the President Macron’s famous 
‘European Intervention Initiative’ is to create a common 
strategic culture amongst European leaders. Despite the 
fact that Macron’s initiative is considered a competitive 
defence evolution to existing EU common ones such 
as PESCO, it is important in the sense of strengthening 
the political willingness among EU leaders. In essence, 
several means and/or structures of defence are evident, 
upon which EU leaders could build a common EU 
defence cooperation context; the missing point is the 
political willingness to do so. As experts on EU defence 
field would argue: the difficulty is not getting EU troops 
together, either within NATO or apart from it, but getting 
them within a reasonable amount of time (e.g. within 48 
hours). 
Very successful examples exist from which parliaments 
can draw interesting conclusions in creating a common 
defence culture, and, therefore, a collective active approach 
towards mutual security threats. One interesting case is 
the Dutch-German cooperation in tanks management. 
Another successful example is the external border man-
agement. Therefore, as the coordination in defence steps 
typically stem from individual member states, examples 
should be drawn from defence partnerships across dif-
ferent member states. That is why inter-parliamentary 
cooperation is more than necessary in this case. 
The European path of cooperation
The sharing of information with national parliaments is 
a very serious component for the enhancement of EU 
defence cooperation. A bigger number of MPs from dif-
ferent member states should be informed about EU secu-
rity and defence policy issues. Do key EU institutions 
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help towards this goal? The role of key EU institutions in 
the defence domain is certainly quite limited. This is evi-
dent, primarily, from the limited impact of CSDP toward 
the communitarisation of defence policy: EU defence 
cooperation remains an intergovernmental business to a 
large extent. 
In theory, there are many venues for inter-parliamentary 
cooperation: party politics, assemblies, the IPEX plat-
form, the COSAC structure (the Conference of Parlia-
mentary Committees for Union Affairs). The Rotating 
Presidency of the Council also has an enhanced parlia-
mentary dimension. Most of these venues seem to work 
well as avenues of networking among different national 
parliaments. However, the crucial aspect is whether 
these venues are efficient in decision-making progress 
and policy formulation cooperation across parliaments. 
For instance, the interaction between the European Par-
liament and the national parliaments has a very limited 
effect. The Inter-Parliamentary Conference on CFSP-
CSDP acts more as a discussion forum than a deci-
sion-making actor. 
The NATO parliamentary assembly comprises the most 
successful case among the existing inter-parliamentary 
conferences. One basic reason is that it has an effec-
tive secretariat that deals with all crucial organisational 
aspects of an inter-parliamentary dialogue (e.g. language 
differences, large number of participants and their logis 
tical organisation). Several times, via this venue, the par-
liamentarians have tried to influence the political agenda 
and obtain concrete results: one case in mind is when the 
ΝΑΤΟ parliamentary assembly pushed for recognition 
that certain cyber-attack issues could be conveyed under 
Article 5. 
Having said that, is a new forum within the EU necessary, 
since there is one in NATO? Despite apparent similari-
ties, especially concerning the personnel of delegations 
(the same people normally attend these sorts of confer-
ences), fundamental differences could be evident with 
the creation of an EU forum compared to the NATO 
setting. These include the degree of institutionalisation 
(for instance, the ΝΑΤΟ parliamentary assembly does 
not have a clear institutional status), the secretariat and 
its function, and the degree of cohesion and socialisation 
among the MPs to name but a few. 
Conclusion: Some proposals for an 
enhanced EU defence cooperation across 
diverse parliaments
The majority of the participants in the High-Level Policy 
Dialogue fundamentally agreed on the importance of 
national parliaments as crucial actors in defence and 
security affairs. EU cooperation and enhancement in the 
defence and security realm can be rigorously improved 
if parliaments play a vital and proactive role towards this 
direction. Nevertheless, how could this happen? 
A first idea would be a closer collaboration between the 
academic world and the policy-making environment. 
Policy-makers from the security and defence policy areas 
should build bridges and communicate more often with 
the academic world. Especially within the area of pro-
curement, both policy-makers and academics should 
work harder together to elaborate more on this policy 
agenda. 
Secondly, members of different national parliaments 
need to focus on successful areas of CSDP and high-
light the common elements of success that could be 
implemented toward a more enhanced cooperation in 
security and defence at EU level. External borders man-
agement is one example of such fruitful cases of achieve-
ment from which existing mutual knowledge would facil-
itate parliamentarians in the formation of joint defence 
projects.
A third note would be an extended engagement of the 
European External Action Service toward the deploy-
ment of joint EU troops. This should be done under the 
political authority of the European Parliament and the 
stronger involvement of national parliaments as initiators 
of such defence campaigns. PESCO seems to act as an 
innovative harbinger toward this direction but stronger
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inter-institutional and inter-parliamentary cooperation is 
necessary for this scope to be pragmatic. 
Finally, Europe needs strategic autonomy in the policy 
area of defence. This sort of autonomy is crucial because 
it opens the door to the creation of an autonomous EU 
defence industry. But, this is not apparently an easy task 
due to the close dependence of European defence key 
technologies on the US. The solution is more cooperation 
at the EU level, but always with a balance with the US.
